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HARRY P. THOMSON, JR.*
THOMAS J. LEITImM**
I. THE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST
Justice does not have a fair chance. Its administration is handicapped
by the prevailing philosophy concerning evidence and its admissibility.
This critical situation will not be -solved until the probative force test
is recognized as the only proper standard for determining admissibility of
evidence. The probative force test, simply stated, is: Evidence is admis-
sible when it is of sufficient force that it logically tends to prove or
disprove a fact or issue necessary to the decision of the particular case,
unless such evidence is excluded by a rule of law or policy not primarily
concerned with the probative force of evidence.
This test is the basic requirement for the admissibility of evidence.
It is not new. As early as 1890 it was discussed by Thayer' and sub-
sequently by other authorities such as Wigmore,
2 McCormick,3 Fisch, 4
and Morgan. 5 For at least the last half century, courts have directed
attention to the probative force test as one of the basic standards govern-
ing admissibility of evidence. References to probative force in appellate
court decisions have become increasingly frequent."
*Partner, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; A.B. 1937,
LL.B. 1939, University of Missouri.
"Parter, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; LL.B. 1948,
Boston College.
1. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW,
ch. VI (1898).
2. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 9-12 (3d ed. 1940).
3. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 152, at 320-21 (1954).
4. FIscH, NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 3 (1959).
5. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, chi. 4 (1963).
6. McIntosh v. Eagle Fire Co., 325 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1963); Sears v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 313 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1963); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d
699 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Hadley v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 120 F.2d 993 (3d Cir.
1941); Larson v. Solbakken, 221 Cal. App. 2d 410, 34 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1963);
Dougherty v. White, 25 Del. 316, 80 Ati. 237 (1911); Bogorad v. Kosberg, 81
A.2d 342 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); Georgia Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Marshall,
207 Ga. 314, 61 S.E.2d 469 (1950); Dent v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 86 Idaho
(516)
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But the basic probative force test is used by appellate courts only
when resort to fundamentals is necessary in order to explain a decision
which would otherwise be inconsistent with the historical formalized
rules of evidence. This basic test has been buried and forgotten under
volumes of discourse on the historical formalized rules, logical relevance,
legal relevance, conditional relevance, prospectant evidence, concomitant
evidence, and retrospective evidence. While such discussion may be in-
teresting, it should be relegated to history. Generally, it is not helpful
to the courts and bar, which are faced with the problem of determining
the admissibility of evidence on a practical, as well as a rational, basis.
American jurisprudence is and must remain a viable process which
adapts itself to modem life and is governed by intelligent analysis in
the search for truth.7 Therefore, it should now be clearly recognized that
the historical formalized rules are merely explanations of the applica-
tion of the probative force test and should no longer be used as tests them-
selves.
The probative force test has been denied its proper place in the
rules of evidence for various reasons, none of which appears to be sound
upon analysis. First, many of the historical formalized rules were stated
by courts as merely explanatory matter for the administration of the
basic test in a particular case. Then subsequent courts, without acknowl-
edging that the application and statement of the ruling by the first court
was merely an application of the basic test of admissibility, followed the
precedent of the first court." Thus a formalized rule of evidence was
created out of context and without proper reference to the entire problem.
This formalization was accelerated by reliance by members of the bar
427, 388 P.2d 89 (1964); Torrey v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 145 Me. 234, 75
A.2d 451 (1950); Haile v. Dinnis, 184 Md. 144, 40 A.2d 363 (1944); Baker &
Theodore, Inc. v. Quinn, 400 S.W.2d 477 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966); Daley v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 81 N.H. 502, 128 Atl. 531 (1925); Miller v. Trans. Oil Co.,
18 N.J. 407, 113 A.2d 777 (1955); Simon v. Graham Bakery, 17 N.J. 525, 111 A.2d
884 (1955); People ex rel. Gannon v. McAdoo, 117 App. Div. 438, 102 N.Y. Supp.
656 (1907); Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 68 N.E.2d 571 (Franklin County,
Ohio Ct. C.P. 1938), aff'd, 36 Ohio Law Abstract 335, 68 N.E.2d 231 (Franklin
County Ct. App. 1939); Trook v. Sagert, 171 Ore. 680, 138 P.2d 900 (1943); Clark
v. Essex Wire Corp., 361 Pa. 60, 63 A.2d 35 (1949); E. R. Wiggins Builders Sup-
plies, Inc. v. Bathgate, 123 Vt. 418, 192 A.2d 461 (1963); McNeir v. Greer-Hale
Chinchilla Ranch, 194 Va. 623, 74 S.E.2d 165 (1953); Golden Gate Hop Ranch,
Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965); Kirchner
v. Smith, 62 W. Va. 639, 58 S.E. 614 (1907).
7. JoNEs, EVIDENCE § 1, at 3 (5th ed. 1958).
8. Lehman, Technical Ries of Evidence, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1926).
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upon the formalized specific rule as a shorthand method of expressing the
fundamental rule.
Second, early textwriters and theorists, in discussing the entire
topic of evidence and its admission, recognized the one fundamental
test, but in the author's opinion, were fearful that without further guides
its administration by the courts in specific cases would be subject to
abuse and distortion. Apparently for this reason, most of the early author-
ities adopted the position that the basic standard was not sufficient and
must be supplemented by formalized rules. Later authorities have tended
to adopt the same skepticism and have been unduly influenced by the
earlier authorities. The fears of the early authorities and the reasons
given for the application of formalized rules in addition to the basic
test cannot now stand modern analysis.
Third, it appears there has been general failure to recognize that
the formalized historical rules were developed only as an indication of the
reliability of evidence in specific situations. For example, the development
and application of the hearsay rule and its numerous exceptions are nothing
more than applications of the probative force test.
Hearsay was originally excluded because it was considered unreliable.
However, certain situations gave a guarantee of reliability so that hear-
say did meet the probative force test. This required a development of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule under the handy nomenclature of res
gestae, admissions against interest, declarations against interest, dying
declarations, and similar categories. To illustrate, the business record
rule does nothing but state that certain recorded items kept in the
ordinary course of business which might be hearsay are maintained and
recorded under circumstances that sufficiently guarantee their probative
force and reliability; therefore, such records are admissible.
A similar review of each formalized historical rule of evidence reveals
that it is founded upon and is an application of the probative force
test. The difficulty is that what started out to be a means of expressing
the probative force test in a particular case has become an end in itself.
The formalized historical rules of admissibility have become so established
that little inquiry is made as to the basic reason for their existence.
Further, the application of formalized historical rules from case to case
obviously creates inconsistencies and conflicts which have to be resolved
unless a just result is denied. Consequently, in the same jurisdiction there
are conflicting decisions by the same appellate court which can only be
explained by returning to the fundamental probative force test.
[Vol. 31
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II. THE URGENT NEED FOR ONE SIMPLE TEST
Because of the application of historical formalized rules of evidence,
facts necessary to the proper determination of disputed issues are fre-
quently either excluded or improperly presented to those who must make
the decision. Too often the application of these rules is without sound
reason in the particular case before the court. In each instance in which
this occurs, it can be fatal to achieving justice.
Substantive law is created by society through its judicial or legisla-
tive representatives. It is and should be governed by precedent. When
it is changed, the change is accomplished with the knowledge of those
concerned with its application. Uncertainty as to substantive law arises
only on questions of interpretation. Whether a fair result may be obtained
upon varying interpretations of substantive law may depend upon the
viewpoint or position of the parties concerned. However, no fair inter-
pretation can be achieved with respect to any particular set of facts
if those facts are incompletely presented.
The one occasion when justice usually fails is when the historical
formalized rules of evidence are applied without reason to determine ad-
missibility of evidence. If a just result is obtained on such occasions, it
is in spite of and not because of the formalized rules of evidence. It is
then due to factors not inherent in the administration of law.
Those who may believe that such statements are extreme fail to
give credence to stronger indictments made by others. Professor Thayer
stated:9
The few principles which underlie this elaborate mass of matter
are clear, simple, and sound. But they have been run out into
a great refinement of discrimination and exception, difficult to
discover and apply; and have been overlaid by a vast body of
rulings at nisi prius and decisions in banc impossible to har-
monize or to fit into any consistent and worthy scheme. A great
portion of these rules, as laid down by the courts and by our
text writers, are working a sort of intellectual fraud by purport-
ing to be what they are not. To the utter confusion of all or-
derly thinking, a Court is frequently represented as passing on
questions of evidence when in reality it is dealing with some
other branch, either of substantive law or procedure. The rules
are thus in a great degree ill-apprehended, ill-stated, ill-digested.
9. THAYER, op. ct. .sfpra note 1, at 511.
1966]
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Professor Thayer again said: 10
In part the precepts of evidence consist of many classes of ex-
ceptions to the main rules,--exceptions that are refined upon,
discriminated, and run down into a nice and difficult attenua-
tion of detail, so that the Courts become lost, and forget that they
are dealing with exceptions; or perhaps are at a loss to say
whether the controlling principle is to be found in the exception
or in the general rule, or whether the exception has not come to
be erected into a rule by itself. In part, our rules are a body of
confused doctrines, expressed in ambiguous phrases, Latin or Eng-
lish, half understood, but glibly used, without perceiving that
ideas, pertinent and just in their proper places are being miscon-
strued and misapplied.
These indictments of the formalized rules of evidence were published
by Professor Thayer as early as 1898. Forty-one years later Professor
Wigmore dedicated the third edition of his work on evidence to Professor
Thayer and Judge Charles Doe of New Hampshire. In it he recognized
the three main faults in the rules of evidence, as they existed in 1939,
as being inflexibility, magnification of details, and overemphasis on errors."
He stated that a complete abolition of the rules as they then existed
was at least arguable-not merely in theory, but in realizable fact. He
suggested that this was "not so impossible as the Bar would have supposed,
a few years ago."' 2
Wigmore proceeded to argue that the time was then not ripe for
such massive reformation in the rules of evidence and that any such
attempt would be futile. His reasons were that most practitioners are un-
skilled in the rules of evidence; jurors must be reckoned with as laymen;
the system of evidence was sound on the whole because it is based on the
experience of human nature; and the judges and members of the bar
must improve in spirit as a prerequisite for any hope of real gain to be
secured from better rules.' 3 The reasons given by this foremost authority
for continuation under the present formalized rules of evidence constitute
an indictment not only of the rules themselves, but also of the judi-
ciary and the trial bar, those members of society charged with the admin-
istration of the rules. It is submitted that these are neither presently accept-
able nor valid practical reasons.
10. Id. at 512.
11. 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. su.pra note 2, § 8c at 264.
12. Id. at 259.
13. Id. at 259-63.
[Vol. 31
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If a problem exists, a solution should be found. It is no excuse that
juries are composed of laymen; so much the better reason to have facts
submitted to them by rules less complex and confusing. It is particularly
unacceptable to defer immediate reform for the stated reason that most
practitioners today are unskilled in the formalized rules of evidence or
that the judges and the practitioners must improve in spirit. This is
not a justifiable excuse if the judiciary and the bar are willing to accept,
as they have, responsibility for the administration of justice. Any con-
clusion that our present system of evidence admissibility is sound on
the whole is defeated by the very reasons given for its continuance and
the flaws which Professor Wigmore and other authorities recognize.
With the passage of additional time the problem presented by for-
malized rules of evidence has become more acute. The solution is available
and reliable, and it should be followed. In 1939 Professor Wigmore re-
marked that the law of evidence was changing, that it was forward
looking, that the last decade had seen a willingness and determination to
improve the law of evidence, and that the forward movement was des-
tined within the coming generation to renovate radically the rules and
the practice under the rules. 14 In the passage of time between the com-
ments of Thayer and of Wigmore, there was little change for the better.
If anything, the situation progressively worsened. The hopeful prediction
of Wigmore has not come to pass, and a massive effort for improvement
is now required.
III. THE ROLE OF THE AcTIvE JUDICIARY AND BAR
m OBTAINING A SOLUTION
As Professor Morgan has pointed out,15 every informed lawyer knows
that the present law of evidence has its defects. Lawyers are inclined
to view horrible examples of the application of formalized rules as idio-
syncrasies of a particular court, perhaps used to secure a desired result
in a difficult case. Neither ignorance nor indifference can change the
situation. In attempting to escape the dilemma posed by the formalized
historical rules, courts have engrafted qualifications, refinements and ex-
ceptions upon the earlier rules, so that the law of evidence has grown
irregularly and in a haphazard fashion.
Professor Morgan remarks that, if an observer confines his examina-
14. Id., Preface at vii.
15. Morgan, Forward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 4-5 (1942).
19661
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tion to a single compartment of the law of evidence, the observer may
not be shocked by the nature of the animal he views. It may be curious,
but it perhaps appears to have some semblance of uniformity. However,
if the partitions between the compartments are broken down, the observer
will be amazed that anyone should contemplate turning into a single field
such diverse and antagonistic creatures. Thus, Professor Morgan relegates
the law of evidence as it now stands to the same place as the early
nineteenth century forms of action in common law pleading. Surely it
must be recognized that any field of the law that is over one century
behind the times is now inadequate. In no other area of the law have
basic principles been so hidden and relegated to the background. 10
Reform will not occur unless it is applied by those engaged in the
actual administration of the law; namely, the active members of the
judiciary and the bar. The existence of the problem and the need for a
solution have been recognized by the American Law Institute's Model
Code of Evidence' 7 and the reports and actions of various committees,
legislatures, and changes in the rules of various courts. The Model Code
of Evidence was a major step forward. Basically, it was a clarification and
simplification of the then existing historical formalized rules. Unfortunately,
it generally has been neither followed nor applied by the courts and its
effectiveness diminished or lost.
One of the difficulties in this major effort to substitute realism for
"rule-ism" and its attendant confusion is that the Model Code did
not reduce the test of admissibility to one simple standard. The re-
luctance to recognize and apply one test for determining the admissibility
of evidence is due to two conflicting considerations. As was recognized by
Judge Irving Lehman,' 8 a lawyer preparing for trial desires to know
with as much certainty as possible what evidence will be admissible. Su-
perficially, the formalized historical rules appear to give a certain guide
as to admission or exclusion. Thus, they are relied upon both by the
courts and the lawyers. Unfortunately, such reliance is misplaced and the
unexpected occurs. For every rule or exception that is applied to a par-
ticular set of facts, another formalized rule or exception is lurking in
16. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L.
REv. 385 (1952).
17. Morgan, Forward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 2 (1942). Cf. CAL.
EVIDENCE CODE (1965) (effective Jan. 1, 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 4, ch. 41(Supp. 1963), ch. 42 (Supp. 1965), ch. 43 (Supp. 1961), ch. 44 (Supp. 1963), ch.
45 (Supp. 1961).
18. Lehman, supra note 8, at 512.
[Vol. 31
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the shadows waiting to be cited and applied to achieve an opposite result.
The general countervailing consideration is that the trial court should
have the discretion to exercise its common sense and place before the
trier of fact all of the essential elements of probative value upon which
to reach a fair determination. The argument against this is that no
lawyer could determine in advance the court's concept of common sense.
Yet in various types of specialized cases the court's power of broad dis-
cretion has not made it impossible for trial advocates reasonably to de-
termine the probable outcome. A common sense application of the pro-
bative force test supplies more certainty than presently exists through
application of the confused formalized rules of evidence.
The irrational development of the historical rules and the resulting
injustice was noted by Judge Lehman. 19 He remarked that most of the
formalized rules developed from administrative reasons for excluding
evidence in a given case. Such a sound administrative reason in a par-
ticular case became a hard and fast precedent which must be applied
in all cases. Rules of administration thus assumed the appearance and
effect of established rules of law. Instead of hastening the course of a trial,
they often confuse and delay. Being so intricate, they often baffle the
judge who seeks to ascertain the truth and the lawyer who seeks to per-
suade the judge, and they sometimes astound the layman by their appar-
ent lack of logic and common sense.
Judge Lehman observed that, to preserve our system of evidence,
some means must be found of refitting it to present conditions. 20 He
recognized the problem and suggested that a differentiation be made
between fundamental rules of universal application and rules of admin.
istration which should be applied only within the limits of sound judicial
discretion. He did not outline the method by which this differentiation was
to be established.
Only active judiciary and the trial bar can effect any practical re-
form. It is suggested that by two fundamental steps they can effect the
reform and prevent injustice without any new legislation or radical pro-
cedural changes. First, the basic definition of what constitutes evidence
should be determined, recognized, and applied; second, the basic reason for
the admission or exclusion of evidence not only should be recognized
as it really exists today, but should be applied in practice.
19. Id. at 513.
20. Id. at 520.
1966]
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IV. WHAT IS EVIDENCE?
The word "evidence" is not self-defining. Standard dictionaries usu-
ally define it as that which is "legally submitted to a competent tribunal
as a means of ascertaining the truth of any alleged matter of fact under
investigation before it."121 This avoids a true definition. It relies upon
the answer to the question we are seeking, that is, whether something con-
stitutes evidence so that it can be legally submitted. Legal dictionaries
are of even less help because they rely upon the result of legal presenta-
tion at trial and sometimes confuse proof or persuasion with the defini-
tion of evidence itself.22 Definitions of the word "evidence" by most au-
thorities avoid the basic definition of the term by relying upon an artifi-
cial rule as to admissibility or legal force as definitive or by confusing
persuasion and proof with basic evidence.
Best defined judicial evidence as natural evidence restrained or mod-
ified by rules of positive law.23 Thayer correctly pointed out that one
fact could be established by another fact only by inference, but in doing
so he tended unduly to emphasize the element of ultimate persuasion. 24
It should be noted that, according to Thayer, a great portion of the
rules of evidence as formulated by the courts and text writers is work-
ing a sort of intellectual fraud by purporting to be what they are not,
that "to the utter confusion of all orderly thinking, a court frequently
is represented as passing on questions of evidence when in reality it is
dealing with some other branch, either of substantive law or of procedure. 12
This illustrates the importance of the fundamental basic definition of
evidence.
Bentham defined evidence as "any matter of fact, the effect, tend-
ency, or design of which is to produce in the mind a persuasion affirm-
ative or disaffirmative of the existence of some other matter of fact."20
More modern writers apparently have not improved upon this definition.
If his language concerning the tendency or design to effect affirmative
or disaffirmative persuasion is converted to the modern terminology of
logically tending to prove or disprove another fact or issue, a definition
21. WEBSTER, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1961).
22. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
23. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 34 (1870).
24. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 411-12.
25. Id. at 511.
26. 1 JONES, EVIDENCE 1 n.1 (5th ed. 1958); see 6 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 208 (Bowring's ed. 1827).
[Vol. 31
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which is relied upon by modem court decisions materializes. Jones referred
to Bentham's definition, but modified it by commenting that "manifestly
the term [evidence] must be given a more restricted meaning when used
with reference to the judicial process of resolving legal disputes. 2 7
This approach is adopted by most of the other authorities in this field,
including Thayer 2s and Wigmore.29
The difficulty with this approach is that it uses the result to establish
the means by which the result is achieved. When an authority on evidence
states that evidence is matter which is admitted before a tribunal deciding
a fact, or is matter admitted under judicial process to determine a fact
or issue, he does little to explain either what evidence is or what evidence
should be admitted. By any rationale, this is no definition.
Greenleaf states that, in legal acceptance, evidence includes all
the means by which any alleged matter of fact is established or disproven
when the truth of such fact is submitted to investigation.30 This defini-
tion has been criticized as being susceptible to the interpretation that
it includes establishment of the truth based not only upon facts or infer-
ences directly arising from facts, but also upon argument. This criticism
is specious. The real criticism should be that it does not actually define
evidence but again relies upon "legal acceptance." It relies upon the
action of a judicial tribunal without referring to any standard upon
which the judicial tribunal should act. The definition contained in the
Uniform Rules of Evidence31 is subject to the same criticism.
It is submitted that the correct definition of evidence which should
be used in determining whether any particular matter is to be submitted
to a judicial tribunal is simply:
Evidence is any matter which in and of itself, or by direct in-
ference, reasonably and logically tends to prove or disprove an-
other fact or matter which the trier of fact is called upon to
determine.
Undoubtedly, this definition can be improved, but at least it is a step
in the right direction. Of course, it assumes that individual members of
society do have some ability to logically reason on a rational basis and
27. 1 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1.
28. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 Htav. L. REv. 141, 147
(1889).
29. 1 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 1.
30. 1 GREENLEAF, EvIDENCE § 1 (5th ed. 1850).
31. Appendix to UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE, Rule 1(1) (1953).
1966]
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to recognize when one fact or series of facts or reasonable inferences
therefrom do directly bear upon proving or disproving another ultimate
fact or issue. This definition is incorporated in the present statement
of the probative force test.
V. RELIABILITY As ADMISSIBILITY
The importance of reliability was indicated early in history. The
Old Testament of the Bible at various places stated requirements for
reliability of evidence. Thus, in Deuteronomy it was required that the
testimony of two, and preferably three, witnesses be given before a
person could be convicted of a capital offense.3 2 As further protection in
any controversy, if a person was found to have borne false witness against
another, he was to be subjected to the same punishment as that to which
the accused would have been subjected if convicted.33
If evidence is reliable to prove or disprove an ultimate fact or issue,
then it meets the probative force test unless it is excluded by a rule of
law or policy not primarily concerned with the probative force of evidence.
It is this element of reliability which leads textbook authorities and the
courts to support the use of formalized historical rules and to discard
mere probative force as not being enough. This is illustrated by Wigmore's
two axioms of admissibility:
I. None but facts having rational probative value are admissible.
II. All facts having rational probative value are admissible un-
less some specific rule forbids.3 4
Wigmore states that the first axiom prescribes merely "that what-
ever is presented as evidence shall be presented on the hypothesis that it
is calculated, according to the prevailing standards of reasoning, to effect
rational persuasion."35 This states nothing more than the obvious. The
question may well be asked as to why Wigmore's first axiom is needed.
If only facts having rational probative value are admissible, then it
follows that none but facts having rational probative value are admis-
sible. It is unnecessary refinement to add "only" to Wigmore's second
axiom as its first word. Although Wigmore appears at first to be discussing
relevancy, his discussion in context, can only refer to reliability.
32. Deuteronomy 17:6-7, 19:15.
33. Deuteronomy 19:16-19.
34. 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 9, at 289, § 10, at 293.
35. Id. § 9, at 289.
[Vol. 31
11
Thomson and Leittem: Thomson: Evidence Admissability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY
Wigmore continues that it would be a complete misconception to
interpret his second axiom to mean that anything that has probative
value is admissible. But in the very next sentence in his text, he states
that "the true meaning [of the second axiom] is that everything having
a probative value is 'ipso facto' entitled to be assumed to be admissible,
and that therefore any rule of policy which may be valid to exclude
it is a superadded and abnormal rule."3 6
If Professor Wigmore made an argument like that in court, his re-
marks would be considered so much double talk. Why use superadded
and abnormal rules? They are unnecessary. It would seem better merely
to state that evidence is admissible unless precluded by some rule of law
or policy, so long as the standard stated in the probative force test is
applied. The rule of law or policy referred to in the probative force test
is clearly defined, is not based upon the law of evidence, and does not
become ensnarled in the fundamental problem of admissibility based
upon the reliability of evidence to prove or disprove an ultimate fact or
issue.
As early as 1910 a Maine decision quoted Thayer 37 on the principles
of admissibility and established the rule that anything which is logically
probative of a fact in issue, to the ordinary reasoning mind, should be
prima facie admissible and should not be excluded unless its admission
would conflict with some principle of law or rule of policy.3 s
Defendant had appealed on the ground that allowing evidence con-
cerning past acts of negligence of defendant's trolley conductor was prej-
udicial. The decision noted that twenty-nine states allow such evidence,
only Massachusetts and Pennsylvania disagreeing. The Maine court, in
substance, stated and used the probative force test. However, it was not
heeded, and when Wigmore complicated Thayer's rules of admissibility
and surrounded them with refining detail, the old and cumbersome rules
continued to be followed.
Earlier and more succinct was the Supreme Court of West Virginia
in furnishing its admissibility rule: "'All facts having rational probative
value are admissible unless some specific rule forbids.' 39 This rule has
suffered three more years than Maine's rule in being ignored.
36. Id. § 10, at 293.
37. THAYER, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 530.
38. Robbins v. Lewiston, A. & W. St. Ry., 107 Me. 42, 77 At. 537 (Sup.
Jud. Ct. 1910).
39. Kirchner v. Smith, 61 W. Va. 434, 449, 58 S.E. 614, 620 (1907), quoting
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 10 (1904).
1966]
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There is no rational basis to exclude evidence which tends to prove
or disprove another fact or an issue necessary to the decision of the case
if that evidence is reliable. The development of the hearsay rule and
its exceptions has previously been referred to as an illustration. The real
excuse for the hearsay rule is simply to guarantee reliability and nothing
more.
Generally, two reasons are ascribed by textbook authorities for the
present existence of the hearsay rule. The first reason is that no testi-
mony should be accepted until it has been tested by cross-examination."
However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Wimberly v. Sovereign
Camp, W.O.W.,41 did not think that cross-examination testing was pri-
marily important in affirming a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant alleged
error in admitting a written record made by defendant's deceased agent
which showed payment of dues by plaintiff's deceased. The court held that
such a record was a declaration against interest or an admission of an agent
acting within the scope of his authority. In effect, the court stated that
the first requirement of cross-examination under the hearsay rule was
unnecessary and resorted to the business record or admission against
interest exceptions to achieve the result. Actually, the basis for the court's
decision was reliability.
Wigmore considers abandonment of the hearsay rule in the vital
aspect of requiring cross-examination as unthinkable.42 Yet, this require-
ment is repeatedly abandoned under exceptions to the hearsay rule,
which exceptions Wigmore supports because such evidence meets the
requirements of reliability without being subject to cross-examination.
The second reason normally given for the hearsay rule is the require-
ment for personal knowledge before a witness can testify. This, too,
seems to be concerned with the reliability of evidence. Wigmore is of the
opinion that this reason is the aspect of the hearsay rule which is en-
forced in too great detail. He maintains that such detailed enforcement
of this aspect has deprived the effect of natural narration of events by a
witness and that the result has been to multiply tenfold the time and
tedium of trial. A vast amount of evidential facts has been excluded,
and the hearsay rule brought into disrepute, by the abuse of this modern
and unessential feature of it. 3
40. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 8c at 277 (3d ed. 1940).
41. 190 S.C. 158, 2 S.E. 2d 532 (1939).
42. 1 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 40, § 8c at 277.
43. Id. at 277-78.
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No matter how it is described or analyzed, the hearsay rule is pri-
marily concerned with reliability, and reliability is guaranteed by the
probative force test properly applied.
Another illustration of not only the concern with reliability, but
also the ridiculous situation which application of the historical formalized
rules engender, is the development of the various dead man's rules or
statutes. These statutes, which exist in most states, merely formalized
a rule of policy, and they should be so recognized. Originally, the pro-
hibition against letting a living party testify to the actions or statements
of a deceased party arose because of the suspicion that the living party
might not tell the truth. The deceased party could not confront him or
testify as to the deceased party's version.
Yet in most states the dead man's statute is not applied if the suit
is against a corporation whose president is now dead. Neither is it
applied in most states if plaintiff's cause of action is directly against the
administrator of the estate of a deceased, as opposed to actions originally
against the deceased which have been revived. The same basic objection
as to reliability exists in each of these situations. If there is any validity
to the dead man's statute, it is recognized by that portion of the probative
force test which excludes evidence otherwise barred by a rule or policy
of law not concerned with probative force.
No matter how formalized or detailed the rules of evidence are made
and no matter how confusingly they departmentalize the fundamental
standards of admissibility, the ultimate determination of the reliability
and admissibility of evidence is upon the trial judge. If a trial judge thinks
evidence is reliable and should be admitted to achieve justice, he will
find a way. The point is, reliance is still placed upon human beings to
determine admissibility, no matter what test is applied. This fact should be
recognized. The probative force test does afford a workable guarantee of
reliability.
VI. TEE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST AND MATERIALITY
Materiality is a completely different consideration from relevancy.
Evidence may be logically, or even legally, relevant to prove an ultimate
fact or issue. That is, it may have probative force to prove such fact or
issue. However, if that ultimate 'fact or issue is not necessary for deciding
the matter before the court, then it is completely immaterial. Professor
1966]
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Trautman, recognizing that materiality and relevancy are often confused,
has stated the clear distinction between each. 44
For example, if a person is charged with murder and admits having
shot the deceased with a revolver, the only justification offered being
self-defense, it is entirely immaterial whether the accused had a permit
for the gun. If suit is brought upon a contractor's performance bond and
the bonding company pleads a complete release, admitting that the bond
was issued, then the circumstances under which it was issued become com-
pletely immaterial. Evidence might be offered on each of these issues
which would logically tend to establish them, but they are not necessary
to a decision of the case.
To put it in the simplest terms, fact A may prove fact B. If fact B
is not before the court for decision, and fact A proves nothing but fact B,
then both fact A and fact B are immaterial and subject to exclusion
on that ground. This requirement of materiality is taken into considera-
tion in the probative force test when it requires that the offered evidence
must tend to prove or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a decision of
t e case before the court. It is stressed, however, that this requirement
should not be confused with relevancy, as Professor James has pointed
out.4 5
VII. THE CASE AGAINST LEGAL RELEVANCY
At least two modem scholars have recognized that legal relevancy
is misleading and has no place in the field of evidence under modern
jurisprudence. Professor Trautman in his excellent article40 concludes
that the concept of legal relevancy, when applied literally, excludes log-
ically relevant evidence unless legal precedent otherwise admits it. He
notes that this results in the exclusion of circumstantial evidence without
reason or explanation, that it creates a large number of cumbersome
rules with exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions, and that true
relevancy is an affair of logic and experience. Indeed, Professor Trautman
states it is difficult to understand how there can be a concept called "legal
relevancy."
Professor James concludes that the ambiguous phrase, "legal rel-
evancy," should be disentangled and returned to the grave where Pro-
44. Trautman, supra note 16, at 386.
45. James, Relevancy, Probability and thke Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941).
46. Trautman, supra note 44, at 412-13.
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fessor Thayer laid it almost fifty years ago.47 Both of these modem
scholars argue that there is no other true measure of relevancy than the
empirical experience of what fact tends to establish or prove another
fact. Both reject the concept of legal relevancy. Some modem court de-
cisions agree, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey has specifically
rejected legal relevancy in at least one leading decision.48
That which is logically relevant must be admitted, unless barred
by an established rule or policy of law not having to do with probative
force. Both Professor Trautman and Professor James adopt the position
that even the exclusionary policies or rules of law should be narrowly
viewed. Regardless of any differences of opinion as to whether such
policies or rules should be narrowly viewed, the probative force test
does take into consideration logical relevancy, while recognizing the exist-
ence of the exclusionary rules and policies.
The concept of legal relevancy is nothing more than logical relevancy
restricted by what a court legally excludes as evidence. This again re-
sorts to using the result to explain or justify the means of admission
or exclusion. This is circuitous reasoning; but the reasoning of Professors
Trautman and James does not appear subject to such attack. The concept
of legal relevancy cannot stand analysis. The best way to eliminate its
meaningless and confusing influence is by the use of the probative force
test.
VIII. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST
The best argument for the use of the simple probative force test is
that it works. It establishes a sound basis for the admissibility of evidence
upon which a rational determination of the facts and issues can be made
by those charged with that responsibility. The fundamental purpose of
evidence is not lost.
If the bench and bar continue to refer to the historical formalized
rules of admissibility, they should recognize certain facts. First, such rules
are nothing more than the application of the probative force test to a
specific piece of evidence under the circumstances of a particular case.
Second, when the application of any historical formalized rule in a partic-
ular situation is inconsistent with or violates the application of the pro-
47. James, supra note 45, at 705.
48. Miller v. Trans Oil Co., 18 N.J. 407, 113 A.2d 777 (1955). Cf. Simon v.
Graham Bakery, 17 N.J. 525, 111 A.2d 884 (1955).
19661
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bative force test, then the rule should be disregarded and admissibility
determined by the probative force test. Third, indiscriminate and literal
application of the historical formalized rules creates inconsistencies which
can only be resolved by resort to the fundamental probative force test.
In other words, it must be recognized that the probative force test is the
governing factor.
The last portion of the present probative force test consists of the
clause, unless such evidence is excluded by a rule of law or policy not
primarlby concerned with, tite probative force of evidence. This clause
gives recognition to the fact that, in order to enable the judicial process
to function, certain policies have to be established either by the courts
or by legislators. The testimony of a witness may well meet the first
portion of the probative force test but still be excluded under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Certain com-
munications, such as those between client and attorney, are, and should
be, absolutely preserved by statute. The dead man's statute excludes
evidence, but this, too, is a matter of social policy rather than one of
probative force. Such a policy may be questioned, but so long as so-
ciety has seen fit to express it, obedience to society's dictate must be
observed.
Actual judicial process recognizes exclusion of evidence as a practical
matter on bases other than the probative force test alone.40 One ex-
ample is the exclusion of admissible evidence which would open up col-
lateral issues to such an extent that confusion would be created and would
impede the decision of the main issue being tried. In exercising discretion
to exclude such evidence involving collateral issues, the court is not con-
cerned primarily with whether the evidence meets the probative force
test. Such evidence may so meet the test and yet be subject to exclu-
sion because it hinders making a rational decision on the main issue.
The exclusion of repetitious or cumulative evidence is another such
policy area normally not incorporated in statutes or codes. Once evidence
reaches the point where it is repetitious or merely cumulative, it should be
excluded for the very practical reason of the limits of time. Conceivably,
it could be argued that such evidence does not meet the probative force
test because, standing alone, it does not have sufficient probative force
49. Cf. Nagy Appeal, 169 Pa. Super. 388, 392, 82 A.2d 591, 593 (1951), where
the court excluded evidence because of a policy against injecting collateral mat-
ters in trial, in spite of its having probative force as to a mental condition.
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to aid in a rational decision of the issue to be decided. This is not a true
application of the probative force test and does violence to its meaning.
Cumulative or repetitious evidence may have as much probative force as
the first evidence introduced on the same subjects. Whether evidence is
cumulative or repetitious depends entirely upon the point of time in
the judicial proceeding at which it is offered. The real reason for exclu-
sion is a practical consideration in the administration of justice. This
should be so recognized.
A most practical application of the probative force test is in adapting
the judicial process to the modern computer age. Under proper circum-
stances statistical runs or compilations from a myriad of facts or data
processed by a computer should be available to the trier of fact charged
with making a decision in a particular case. It is no answer to state that,
upon proper evidence, computerized data or analysis can qualify ,for ad-
missibility. If the historical formalized rules of admissibility are literally
applied, it is seldom that this type of evidence would be admissible.
Further, the testimony of experts and those programming the computer
may take far more time than is justified, if compliance with the historical
formalized rules is required without reference to the fundamental pro-
bative force test.
This problem has already been encountered, particularly in patent
litigation, anti-trust litigation, and protracted cases of all types. The his-
torical formalized rules simply are not adequate to reasonably determine
the admissibility of this type of evidence. It is submitted that when
this type of evidence is offered the probative force test will have to be
resorted to by requiring the establishment of reliability and a showing
that such evidence logically tends to prove or disprove an issue in the
case. Otherwise, yet another formalized rule is going to be developed to
add to the general confusion.
IX. CONCLUSION
The probative force test as now stated is, and always has been, the
only true standard for determining the admissibility of evidence. It elim-
inates misleading concepts and applies a rational basis for determining
admissibility of evidence. In simple language, it provides a single and
exclusive measure for admissibility so that both the trial judge and lawyer
have a practical guide.
The present trend is to recognize the probative force test and to give
19661
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less emphasis to the historical formalized rules. Any searching analysis
of the historical formalized rules or the reasons given for their existence
casts grave doubt upon their justification and emphasizes that there is
only one basic test of admissibility-the probative force test. The sooner
this is recognized, the sooner the administration of justice will be improved.
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